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Abstract
The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double
purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappro-
priate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead
to ine¢ ciencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic
treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per
capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic ar-
eas in Switzerland. We nd evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing
practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that
health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing
practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
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1 Introduction
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are main aspects of access to primary health care.
Dispensing has been physiciansresponsibility for long time. Nowadays, in developed
countries physiciansmain role is to prescribe drugs without direct dispensing (Trap,
1997).1 The reason is two-fold. First, the need to avoid a conict of interest for the
prescriber, and second, to optimise rationality of treatment by ensuring good practice
in dispensing (Trap and Hansen, 2003). The latter explanation recalls the fact that
pharmacists can often review doctorsprescriptions and check contraindications and
drug interactions.
However, direct dispensing of drugs is generally possible in some countries, likely
for the purpose of improving access to pharmaceuticals. For instance, one Scottish
region (Highland) included almost 20% of the total number of dispensing doctors
in Scotland in 2005 (Information Services Division of the National Health System
in Scotland, 2006). In Switzerland, physicians are allowed to sell drugs directly
to their patients in most cantons, with few exceptions.2 The reason may not lie
straightforwardly in the regulators objective to compensate for the lack of access
to drug treatment. Historical and cultural aspects may have contributed to shape
di¤erent rules across the country. Consequently, the low density of pharmacies in one
area may either be the reason that led the regulator to allow for self-dispensing or the
consequence of the advantage of dispensing practices in comparison to pharmacies.
The proportion of dispensing practices among all practices is highly heterogeneous
across the country and is only slightly correlated with the degree of urbanization.3
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of practice regulation in enhancing
access to antibiotic treatment and reducing inappropriate use of antibiotics. It has
been suggested that the regulatory policy that allows physicians to sell drugs directly
to the patient may unintentionally promote the overuse of drugs (Holloway, 2005;
Nelson, 1987). A question arises as to whether the regulator underestimates the
1For instance, doctors are not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients in Germany and the
Scandinavian region.
2Switzerland is a federal state made of 26 cantons with remarkable di¤erences in terms of orga-
nization of the health care system and health care policy. Self-dispensing is not allowed in Geneva,
Vaud, Balle ville, Ticino and Argau.
3The Swiss territory can be divided into 240 small areas, each of them with at least four phar-
macies, drugstores or dispensing practices. The coe¢ cient of correlation between the proportion of
dispensing doctors and the density of the population was -0.27 in 2002. The correlation with the
density of pharmacies was -0.36.
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potential ine¢ ciencies induced by incentives on dispensing practices.
The literature lacks theoretical analysis of self-dispensing and empirical investiga-
tions generally use a correlation coe¢ cient approach rather than applying econometric
models. There is evidence that prescribing costs per patient in dispensing practices
are higher than costs in non dispensing practices. This may be explained by reluc-
tancy to prescribe generics (Morton-Jones and Pringle, 1993). Moreover, dispensing
doctors charge higher retail prices (Abood, 1989). Finally, they have a tendency to
prescribe more drugs per capita in comparison with non dispensing practices (Trap et
al., 2002). This seems to be particularly evident for antibacterials. Focusing on one
antibiotic substance (cotrimoxazole), Trap and Hansen (2002) examined di¤erences
in the rationality of the prescription in relation to diagnosis and symptoms between
dispensing and non dispensing doctors. Dispensing doctors were found to prescribe
an antibiotic 2.5 times more frequently than other doctors. As a consequence, dis-
pensing practices may lead to increasing health hazards and bacterial resistance.
In this article we propose a theoretical model of the market for community an-
tibiotic treatment. Under a fee-for-service remuneration scheme as in Switzerland,
doctors receive a consultation fee which varies with time allocated to the patient and
the diagnostic tests performed. Dispensing doctors may incur additional costs for
drugs in stock and gain a margin on antibiotics sold to the patient. We argue that
the interaction between imperfect information on the nature of patients infection and
economic incentives to dispensing practices may increase the likelihood of antibiotic
prescriptions, ceteris paribus.
We then investigate the impact of dispensing practices on the individual outpa-
tient antibiotic consumption empirically, using data from small geographical areas in
Switzerland. The e¤ect of dispensing practices is disentangled by means of econo-
metric estimations which take into account the main demand-side and supply-side
determinants of antibiotic use.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the model and derive
the equilibrium levels of antibiotic use for dispensing and non dispensing practices.
Section 3 empirically investigates the impact of dispensing practices on antibiotic use
and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 A model of markets for antiinfective treatment
In the market for primary care there are N individuals uniformly distributed along
a circle line. We model the interaction between patients and providers of primary
care when antiinfective treatment is needed as a sequential choice in four stages. At
the beginning of stage 1, nature assigns a health problem (mild respiratory or gastro-
intestinal infection) i 2 fb; vg to each individual, where b is a bacterial infection and
v represents a viral infection. Consumers initially observe a symptom but cannot
infer the type of infection they su¤er from. We assume that both types of infections
are equally likely. Hence, the probability of having a bacterial infection is p = p[i =
b] = p[i = v]  1=2.4
Patients recover naturally from viral infections after some time, by the end of
stage 2. However, treatment with healing drugs (NA) suitable, for instance, to re-
duce body temperature (antipyretic or anti-inammatory), cough (syrup) or nose
constipation (spray), decreases the cost of illness because of quicker recovery and/or
less discomfort. Treatment with antibiotics (A) is necessary to recover from a bacte-
rial infection. On the other hand, antibiotics do not provide any additional benet
against viral infections. The depicted scenario applies for instance to mild respiratory
tract infections in the community, such as colds, rhynofaringites, mild pneumonia and
otitis.
In the market, there are two types of rms: M general practitioners (GPj, with j 2
[1; ::;M ]) andM retailing pharmacies (PHj), withM  2. General practitioners can
either be allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients or not, depending on patients
cost of access to health care providers. Practices and pharmacies are located at equal
distance around the circle and any couple of rms of di¤erent types is characterised
by the same location. All the same types of rms have equal size.
Patients di¤er with respect to their spatial location between any two couples of
providers and to the type of infection they su¤er from. We normalise the total market
distance to 1. Hence, a patient is located at distance dl 2 [0; 1=M ] from the nearest
couple of providers at his left and at distance dr = 1=M   dl from the providers at
his right. The di¤erentiation parameter d can either be interpreted as a geographical
distance between the individual and the provider location or the distance between
4The assumption of dichotomous health problems is quite common in the literature. For instance,
Jelovac (2001) assumes that patients have the same probability of su¤ering from a mildillness as
well as from a severeone.
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the individuals preferences and the characteristics of the provider that maximises his
utility.
In stage 1 individuals maximise their expected utility by choosing among the
following 3 alternatives: 1: to consult a doctor and buy the prescribed drugs from
a pharmacist afterwards; 2: to purchase some drugs directly from the pharmacist;
3: to do nothing and wait for natural recovery (Figure 1). The rst alternative
may either imply that the patient recovers at the end of stage 2 or that the patient
needs an additional consultation to get an antibiotic treatment that was not initially
prescribed. This is because the doctors diagnosis is not always correct. As for
the second alternative, antibiotic treatment is not contemplated since this requires
a doctors prescription. Patients will then receive an antipyretic/anti-inammatory.
This may imply that a consultation with a doctor is required later on (stage 4).
Finally, sick individuals can decide to wait and do nothing, at least for some time
(until the end of stage 3). If the patient su¤ers from a bacterial infection and does
not recover naturally, a doctors consultation will then be necessary in stage 4.
2.1 Information structure
Patients are imperfectly informed about the level of services (ej) provided by doctor j.
They know the minimum and the maximum levels of services that could be provided,
hence observe the range of values ej 2

emin; emax

and assume that each value
in the range is equally likely. Patients then expect the average level of services
e^j = e 
 
emin + emax

=2.5
The level of services provided by GPs is related to diagnosis/prescription accuracy
through a technological relationship which is the same for all GPs. We dene pcj 2
[0; 1] as the probability of a correct prescription by GP j. More services increase the
probability of a correct prescription through the following simple relationship pcj =
g(ej) = ej with  2 [0; 1]. Consequently, given a level of services ej, the probability
that the diagnosis is a bacterial infection and an antibiotic is prescribed is ppcj =
1
2
ej.
The probability of mistaken diagnosis will then be 1
2
(1   ej). Patients are aware
5Note that patients are assumed to expect the same levels of diagnostic services from dispensing
and non-dispensing doctors. This hypothesis could be plausibly relaxed if the two types of practices
provide di¤erent levels of services in equilibrium. Note, however, that the following Proposition 1
predicts that lower levels of diagnostic services increase doctors initial demand, ceters paribus. This
would in turn increase marginal benets and, hence, lead to higher levels of diagnostic services.
Consequently, an improvement in patientsperceptions of the levels of diagnostic services provided
may reduce the potential gap between dispensing and non-dispensing practices.
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that higher intensity of services increases the probability of a correct prescription but
dont know the true level of ej. They expect to come back for a second consultation
if they do not recover by the end of stage 3. At this stage the nature of the infection
(bacterial) is fully revealed. Hence, patients correctly assume that the initial diagnosis
was wrong. Similarly, patients are assumed to realize that they need an antibiotic
if the waiting strategy has failed or drugs purchased from the pharmacist were not
e¤ective at the end of stage 3.
We normalize ej to 1= and set emin = 0 and emax = 1=.
2.2 Expected net benets of care
A consultation with a doctor has a cost f (1 + ej) and does not depend on the kind
of prescription which follows. In Switzerland, general practitioners are paid under a
pure fee-for-service scheme. This implies that total reimbursement for a consultation
depends upon the level of services provided.6 The cost of treatment with drugs, either
antibiotic or antipyretic/anti-inammatory, is z (z < f).7 Since primary health care
services are covered by compulsory health insurance contracts, patients pay only a
small fraction () of the total cost of care.
Patients incur distance costs tdj to purchase services from provider j, where t is
the unit cost of distance. The discomfort, or the cost of time for recovering, when
patients are not given an e¤ective treatment is x. We summarise the costs implied by
alternative treatments conditional upon the type of infection and the initial choice
of provider in Table 1. To simplify notation we dene w1j = [f (1 + ej) + z] and
w2j = [f (1 + ej) + 2z].
For instance, consider a patient with a viral infection who decides to see doctor
j. The GP may decide to prescribe an antipyretic/anti-inammatory, without an
antibiotic. Consequently, the total cost of treatment conditional to the type of in-
fection (viral) and to the provider (GP ) includes the partial cost of a consultation
(f (1 + ej)), plus the partial cost of prescribed drugs (z) that will be purchased
6For instance, a consultation has a xed fee for the rst ve minutes allocated to the patient. A
diagnostic test to assess the type of infection implies an additional fee. We assume that there is a
continuum of services. Hence, the total fee increases with the intensity of care provided ej .
7We hypothesise that the cost of antibiotic doses and other types of drugs is the same. If the cost
of antibiotics is higher than the cost of other drugs, the patient more likely prefers to do nothing
or to see a pharmacist rather than to consult a general practitioner. This, however, does not have
relevant implications for our analysis, as shown later in Section 2.4.
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either from a pharmacy or, if allowed, directly from the practice, and the cost of
distance (tdj). This gives w1j+ tdj in Table 1. However, if the GP makes a wrong
diagnosis, an antibiotic is prescribed as well. The total cost of drugs will increase to
2z and the total cost of treatment will be w2j+ tdj.
2.2.1 Patients choice
A fully recovered patient has utility uh > 0 dened in monetary terms. Hence, the
expected net benets from choosing practice j are dened as
u^GPj = u
h   1
2
e^j (w^1j + tdj)  1
2
e^j (w^2j + tdj)
 1
2
(1  e^j) (w^2j + tdj)  1
2
(1  e^j) (2w^1j + 2tdj + x)
= uh   1
2
[(3  e^j) (w^1j + tdj) + z + (1  e^j)x] , (1)
where w^j is the expected value of wj.
The terms inside the brackets on the rst line of equation (1) indicate the costs
of treatment when a viral infection is correctly diagnosed (rst term), a bacterial
infection is correctly diagnosed (second term), a viral infection is wrongly diagnosed
and an antibiotic is prescribed (third term), and a bacterial infection is wrongly
diagnosed so that patients need a second consultation (fourth term).
The expected net benets of waiting are derived in detail in the Appendix. We
can summarise them as
u^Wj = u
h   x  1
2
(w^2j + tdj) . (2)
Similarly, we can write the expected net benet of consulting a pharmacist as
u^PHj = u
h   1
2
[ (z + w^2j) + x+ 3tdj] . (3)
The above assumption on patients information implies that patients choice of
practice is initially based upon costly distance.8 Patients at distance dj  1=(2M)
from GPl will then prefer to consult GPl instead of GPr. Similarly, patients with
8Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007) assume that a proportion of patients is uninformed
and chooses a doctor according to distance. Gravelle and Masiero (2000) assume that patients
observe practice quality with an error and then learn by experience. These models focus on capitated
systems rather than fee-for service. Our assumption is useful to simplify the model and to focus on
patients alternative strategies rather than competition among providers of the same type. We then
ignore the impact of patients information structure on the choice of practice.
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distance dj > 1=(2M) will choose GPr. The choice of pharmacy follows the same rule
since pharmacists are assumed to comply with doctors prescriptions.9 Consequently,
the second stage of the game (choice between competing rms of the same type)
identies the couple of (preferred) providers (GPm, PHm) that minimises the cost of
access to antiinfective treatment for each patient.
From comparison between 1 and 3 for any j 2 [1; ::;M ], with e^j = e and w1 =
f (1 + e) + z, we get
Proposition 1 Consultation with a GP is preferred to the initial advice of a phar-
macist by all the patients if x >  (3 w1   2z)  xGP .
Patients are more likely to choose a GP if the expected level of diagnostic services
(e in w1) is lower. Since the main focus of our analysis is on antibiotic use under
di¤erent incentives for doctors (with and without self-dispensing), we simplify the
model by assuming x > xGP . This means that patientsdiscomfort from waiting is
great enough to imply that patients split in two groups: those who initially decide to
consult a doctor and those who prefer to wait.
2.3 Demand for GP consultations
The proportion of patients who prefer a consultation with a GP is derived by com-
parison of (1) and (2). Patients will initially consult a GP if the minimum distance
from a practice (dm = min fdjg) is
dm <
x   w1
t
 1. (4)
Hence, we have
Proposition 2 Patients prefer a visit with a GP rather than wait if disutility from
waiting (x) minus the cost of treatment ( w1) overcomes the cost of distance (tdm).
By summing up the two market segments to the left-hand side and to the right-
hand side of GP j, we obtain doctors initial demand for consultations as10
Dj = 2N1  2N

x   w1
t

. (5)
9We neglect potential incentives to substitute brand names with generic drugs.
10For comparison, doctor js initial demand with x < xGP is 2N (1   2) =
4N
t [x   (2 w1   z)] < Dj , with 2 = (3 w1 2z) xt (see Appendix).
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Proposition 3 Physicians demand increases with the number of infected patients
(N), the discomfort from waiting (x), and decreases with the cost of distance from
the practice (t), and the cost of consultation and treatment (f (1 + e) and z in w1).
Note that patients cost of access (the unit cost of distance t) reduces the demand
for GP consultations. High levels of t may induce the regulator intervention to allow
for direct dispensing.
The demand dened in (5) does not depend upon the number of practice rms
M as far as some patients prefer to wait rather than to consult a GP .11 Doctors
initial demand is the same for all GPs since it does not depend on physicians actions.
Hence, we drop the indexed notation and use D instead of Dj for GPs initial demand
in the following section.
2.3.1 Disappointment from delayed antibiotic treatment
Patients with a bacterial infection may receive a wrong diagnosis and then undertake
an additional consultation to switch to antibiotic treatment. Those who decide to
come back to the practitioner initially chosen, will increase doctors demand. Con-
versely, doctors may loose a proportion of patients who are not satised with antibi-
otic treatment delay. Some patients who need to see a doctor again after few days
from the rst consultation, may think that the doctor initially consulted was wrong.
All these patients are now aware that they need an antibiotic and expect that any
doctor will prescribe this treatment.
A patient will change the doctor if disappointment for inappropriate treatment,
, plus the cost of distance overcome the cost of distance from joining the alternative
practice, hence if td+  > t( 1
M
  d). Solving for d we nd a critical distance12
d =
 
t
M
  
2t
 c; (6)
such that patients with d > c < 1 will switch out from practice j. Consequently,
the number of patients leaving the practice is Soutj = max

1
2
(1  ej)(1   c)D; 0
	
.
11The initial demand for consultations for GP j when all the patients prefer a visit with a GP
rather than wait is derived in the Appendix and decreases with the number of rms in the market.
12Note that disutility from inappropriate treatment () and disutility from waiting or late recovery
(x) is not the same. This is because we assume that  includes disappointment for the wrong
diagnosis.
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Similarly, we dene the number of patients switching to practice j from the two neigh-
bouring practices j+ and j  as Sinj = max

1
4
[(1  ej+) + (1  ej )] (1   c)D; 0
	
.
Using distances dened by (4) and (6) we can establish that
Proposition 4 For  > t
M
  2 (x   w1)  s some patients always switch practice
after a wrong diagnosis.
For instance, if disutility from inappropriate treatment () and disutility from
waiting or late recovery (x) is the same, i.e. for  = x, some patients switch in both
directions provided that x > t=(3M) + 2 w1=3  xs since this satises 1   c > 0.
Note that when all the patients prefer to consult a GP rather than waiting (see
Appendix), there are at least some patients who change GP after a wrong diagnosis.
This is because  > s  0.
2.4 Physicians behaviour
General practitioners have an objective function which depends upon the level of
services provided and the cost for inappropriate treatment. For practice j we can
write the following expression
j = [f (1 + ej)  c]

D +
1
2

N
M
 D

+
1
2
(1  ej)D   Soutj + Sinj

  e2j , (7)
where c is the xed marginal cost of a consultation (c < f) and  is the marginal cost
of diagnostic services.13 The initial demand of the GP j is increased by the demand
from patients with bacterial infection who initially decide to wait and do not recover
without doctors prescription. The number of these patients is 1
2
 
N
M
 D. Patients
with a bacterial infection who need a second consultation because of wrong diagnosis
are 1
2
(1  ej)D.
The level of diagnostic services is assumed to be a local public good, i.e. it does
not depend upon the number of patients diagnosed. The hypothesis suggests that
improvements in diagnosis accuracy are related to the availability of a diagnostic
technology rather than time spent with a patient.
13Discounting for future prots is not applied since GPs maximize one-period prot. Although
there is a time span between di¤erent stages of the game and patients realize the success or the
failure of the initial consultation, this is indeed a short period of time (few days). Overlapping
generations of patients are not considered in the model, nor is the possibility of repeated cases of
infection in our cohort of patients. Our model is rather suitable to capture doctors behaviour under
seasonal epidemic threat with annual recurrence.
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2.4.1 Dispensing physicians
Dispensing physicians may di¤er from other practitioners for at least two reasons.
Doctors may incur some costs for keeping drugs on stock. In this sense they are more
similar to a pharmacy, compared to non-dispensing practices. A shortage in the stock
may create some troubles if patients cannot receive the treatment when it is required.
On the other hand, keeping drugs in stock for a certain period of time increases the
risk of getting closer to the expiry date. Unsold drugs may imply some costs for the
practice.
In Switzerland, dispensing physicians also get a mark-up on drugs prescribed.
Other types of incentives are less likely. Plausibly, dispensing doctors are subject to
pressure from pharmaceutical companies to increase prescriptions to the same extent
as other doctors. Moreover, the doctors do not receive any additional fee for delivering
drugs to their patients.
The objective function of the general practitioner dened by (7) can then be
modied to include additional expected costs and benets of self-dispensing as
dj = [f (1 + ej)  c+ (1   2) z]Dc   e2j ; (8)
where Dc = D + 1
2
 
N
M
 D + 1
2
(1   ej)D   Soutj + Sinj is the total demand for
consultations as it appears in (7), 1z is the mark-up on drugs directly dispensed and
2z represents the expected cost per patient of avoiding a prescription and keep stock
of drugs.
2.5 Market equilibrium
Practice rms maximise their prots in a Nash-Cournot game where the levels of
diagnostic services of the neighbouring competitors are given. Consequently, we si-
multaneously consider the set ofM objective functions j. Using (7) we derive prot
with respect to the level of diagnostic services
@j
@ej
=  2ej   [f (1 + ej)  c] 1
2
D [1  (1   c)]
+f

D +
1
2

N
M
 D

+
1
2
(1  ej)D   Soutj + Sinj

: (9)
Since practice js prot depends upon the level of diagnostic services of the two
neighbouring practices, j+ and j , we solve the set of rst-order conditions @j=@ej =
@j=@ej+ = @j=@ej  = 0. Substituting for 1 and 
c we then get
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Proposition 5 A Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the level of diagnostic services is
dened by
e =
f (  ) + c
f + 2
N
; (10)
where  = 1
2M
+21,  = 1 (1  1 + c) and  = 1 (2  1 + c), with  >  > .
Note that patientsdisappointment for delayed antibiotic treatment,  in c, in-
creases the level of diagnostic services since it raises the cost of punishment (switching
out of practice).14 The level of diagnostic services also increases with the number of
infected patients (N) and decreases with the marginal cost of e¤ort  and the e¢ -
ciency of services .15
When access is more costly patients are more likely to wait than to choose a
practice. Access to GP consultations captured by the cost of distance t has a negative
impact on the equilibrium level of services.16 The rationale is that the marginal gains
from increasing the level of services provided to the patient is lower. However, lower
levels of diagnostic services may imply higher rates of antibiotic use, as we will show
later.
Similarly, the disutility of waiting, x, increases GP attractiveness compared to the
doing nothingstrategy. Since the demand for consultations increases, the marginal
gain from consultations increases as well. Hence, doctors have the incentive to im-
prove the level of diagnostic services.17 On the other hand, the cost of a consultation
and the cost of treatment (w1) reduce the level of services. This is because patients
are less likely to choose a GP initially and marginal gains from attracting additional
patients are lower.
Finally, the number of providers, M , has a double e¤ect. First, it decreases
diagnostic services since the marginal benet from higher treatment accuracy is re-
duced (M reduces  and c in ). This suggests that the density of general practices
14A decrease in  reduces the denominator to a larger extent than the numerator in (10).
15The marginal e¢ ciency of services  in  and  has a negative e¤ect on e since f > c and
@
@ > 0.
16The cost of distance has a negative impact on 1 and a positive impact on 
c. This leads to
decreasing . The impact on  is also negative provided that  < t + t2M   2 (x   w1) > s.
Similarly for , since @=@t < @=@t. Consequently, t has a negative e¤ect on all the parameters
,  and . Note that this e¤ect is stronger for the numerator than the denominator in (10) since
@=@t < @=@t < @=@t, at least for values of f very close to c. As a result, e decreases with t.
17Disutility of waiting has a positive impact on 1 and increases both ,  and . The nal impact
on e is positive.
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may have relevant implications on the use of antibiotics. The result will be further
discussed in the following section. Second, diagnosis accuracy increases since the
density of practices tightens the competition for patients (M reduces c in ). Hence,
disappointed patients who may decide to switch practice contribute to decrease prof-
itability of poor diagnostic services. The former e¤ect is generally stronger than the
latter.
2.5.1 Equilibrium with self-dispensing
Using the objective function for self-dispensing doctors dened by (8) and following
the procedure for prot maximization above, we obtain
Proposition 6 A Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the level of diagnostic services with
self-dispensing (1 > 0 and/or 2 > 0) is dened by
ed =
f (  ) + [c  (1   2) z]
f + 2
N
: (11)
Note that (1   2) z increases or reduces the equilibrium level of services depend-
ing on the relative magnitude of 1 and 2. If the cost of antibiotic treatment delay
and stocking drugs is higher than the mark-up from drug dispensing, i.e. 1 < 2,
then ed < e. Diagnosis accuracy is lower for dispensing practices.18 This e¤ect
may reinforce the impact of the cost of access. An equilibrium with self-dispensing
is generally marked by higher costs of distance compared to an equilibrium without
direct dispensing. This is because the regulator allows for self-dispensing when the
costs of access are high enough. This will have important implications on the per
capita levels of antibiotic use.
18As an alternative we could specify an objective function where dispensing doctors are aware that
access to practices is more di¢ cult in poorly urbanized areas. In this case doctors may internalize
part of the costs of distance for the patient. If we substitute d for z we obtain a similar speci-
cation. Dispensing practitioners reduce their diagnostic services and are more likely to prescribe
antibiotics to avoid a follow-up visit, i.e. additional costs of distance. A similar result could be
obtained by assuming that poorly urbanized areas imply higher unit cost of distance (t) for the
patient. This reduces patients access to the practice and the risk of loosing disappointed patients,
who might consider to switch to alternative practices. The implication for the equilibrium level
of services is always a decrease. Consequently, total antibiotic use under self-dispensing increases
compared to dispensing restrictions.
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2.6 Antibiotic prescriptions
Using the equilibrium level of diagnostic services in (10) and (11), we can summarize
the number of antibiotic prescriptions per capita. A number of patients 1
2
(e)D
receive a correct diagnosis of bacterial infection and are treated with antibiotics at
the rst consultation. Misdiagnosed patients with a viral infection also receive an
antibiotic at the rst consultation. These are 1
2
(1   e)D patients. Some patients
su¤ering from a bacterial infection with a wrong diagnosis at the rst consultation
will be prescribed an antibiotic at the second visit. The number of these patients
is 1
2
(1   e)D. Finally, some patients did not see any doctor initially (provided
that x < xc). Some of them, 1
2
 
N
M
 D, have a bacterial infection and require a
consultation with a doctor followed by an antibiotic prescription. Summing up all
the patients receiving antibiotics and dividing by practice market share (N=M) we
derive the per capita antibiotic use without and with self-dispensing as
a =
1
2
+ (1  e) 1M , (12)
ad =
1
2
+
 
1  ed 1M . (13)
The term inside the brackets in both equations indicate the number of antibiotic
treatment prescribed for viral infections because of wrong diagnosis. Note that a <
ad since e > ed, ceteris paribus. However, if direct dispensing is allowed only if the
unit cost of distance is above a given threshold, 1 is reduced under self-dispensing,
which in turn reduces antibiotic prescriptions per capita. The two opposite e¤ects
postulate that
Proposition 7 Dispensing practices are more likely to overprescribe antibiotics com-
pared to other practices, as far as the incentive to reduce diagnosis accuracy overcomes
the negative impact on demand for consultations due to higher costs of access.
The empirical analysis in Section 3 will posit that the net e¤ect of self-dispensing
on antibiotic prescriptions per capita is likely to be positive.
Some interesting features can be straightforwardly derived from both (12) and
(13). The number of practices (M) has two reinforcing e¤ects on the per capita
antibiotic use. First, it raises consumption since access to practices increases and
patients are more likely to choose a doctor initially rather than wait. Second, it
increases antibiotic consumption (M in e, with e 2 e; ed	) because the level of
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diagnosis accuracy is reduced. Doctors have lower marginal benets from improving
diagnostic services, which in turn increases inappropriate prescriptions.
Similarly, patients cost for waiting x increases antibiotic use since patients are
more likely to consult a GP (x in 1). However, since doctors expect higher benet
from consultations, diagnostic services are more valuable. The increase in diagnosis
accuracy reduces the number of additional consultations. In other words, delayed
antibiotic treatment is more protable and tends to reduce total consumption (x in
e).
Surprisingly enough, the number of infected patients decreases the per capita
antibiotic use. Although the total number of prescription is expected to increase,
the per capita antibiotic use may slightly go down. We assumed that patients incur
just one infection per period and that the external benets from antibiotic use are
not taken into account by doctors decisions. The incidence of infections increases
doctors demand, hence the expected benets from increases in diagnosis accuracy
(N raises e). This leads doctors to reduce inappropriate prescriptions per patient.
The marginal cost of diagnostic services ( in e) decreases the equilibrium levels
and hence increases antibiotic use per capita. Conversely, the e¢ ciency of the di-
agnosis ( in e) improves the diagnosis accuracy and reduces per capita antibiotic
consumption.
It is worth noticing that patients disappointment for antibiotic treatment delay
( in e) reduces the use of antibiotics since it induces more diagnostic services and
hence increases appropriate prescriptions.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Econometric specication
To assess the impact of dispensing practices on antibiotic consumption we use data
on the per capita antibiotic use and possible determinants in 240 small market areas
in Switzerland during the four quarters of 2002. The variables are summarized in
Table 2.
Our theoretical model suggests that the per capita antibiotic use in the market
area depends upon the number of physicians, the incidence of infections, the cost
of access to alternative providers of primary care, and incentives attached to direct
15
dispensing of drugs.19 Plausibly, such characteristics as age, income and cultural as-
pects are related to the discomfort from waiting, x, the disappointment for antibiotic
treatment delay, , the cost of distance, t, and the marginal cost of a consultation, c,
which a¤ect doctors level of diagnostic services in (10) and (11).
The model hypothesises that a consultation with a GP is considered when pa-
tients health status is poor enough and doctors cannot a¤ect the demand for medical
treatment before an appointment has been taken. Consequently, the number of an-
tibiotic prescriptions per individual can be measured by a and ad in (12) and (13).
The probability of an antibiotic prescription during a consultation is a¤ected by the
incidence of bacterial infections and doctors practice style, i.e. doctorsattitudes
towards uncertainty on the nature of the infection.20
A course of treatment with antibiotics is given by a number of standard daily
doses. Using (12)-(13) we then dene DIDk = 1000ak, the number of dened daily
doses per 1000 inhabitants in the market area k (k 2 [1; ::; 240]). We then postulate
the following relationship:
DIDk = f(Yk; POPlk; INFk; DPHYk; DPHAk; Pk; (14)
DBORk; DLATk; DHOSk; NOSELFk; SELFk; DTt);
where Yk is the average income in the area; POPlk is the percentage of the population
in the l age range; INFk is the incidence of bacterial infections (campylobacter and
salmonella);21 DPHYk and DPHAk are respectively the density of physicians in the
area and the density of pharmacies; and Pk is the price of a dened daily dose of
antibiotic.
DBORk, DLATk, and DHOSk are dummy variables. The rst one captures
19Many studies assume that the demand for physicians services depends on a set of socioeconomic
characteristics of the population (Hunt-McCool et al., 1994; Carlsen and Grytten 1998; Grytten and
Sorensen, 2003).
20Comparison of antibiotic prescription rates for children between Italy and Denmark shows that
Italian children receive more courses of antibiotics than Danish children (Resi et al. 2003; Thrane
et al., 2003). Kozyrskyj et al. (2004) show that the prescription of antibiotics for viral respira-
tory tract infections is less likely by pediatricians than by general practitioners. Also, physicians
with a Canadian or an American training are less likely to prescribe a second line of antibiotics
than those trained elsewhere. Finally, the age of physicians and the a¢ liation to a hospital has
a signicant impact on the prescribing practice. Trémolieres (2003) underlines experience, past
and permanent training, information dissemination by the pharmaceutical industry and location as
important factors a¤ecting doctors prescriptions of antibiotics.
21These are the leading causes of gastrointestinal infections. Since data are not available at local
level, we use information at cantonal level.
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any borderland e¤ect with neighbouring countries. The second considers whether
an area is mainly characterised by Latin culture (French- and Italian-speaking), or
German culture. The third dummy accounts for at least one hospital in the area.
NOSELFk and SELFk capture the impact of direct dispensing of antibiotic use.
NOSELFk takes value equal to 1 if there are no dispensing practices in the area,
0 otherwise; SELFk takes value equal to 1 if the proportion of dispensing practices
in the area is greater than 50%. The intermediate case where the proportion of
dispensing practices is greater than 0 and lower than 50% represents our benchmark.
DTt are time dummies (t = 2; 3; 4 since the rst quarter is excluded to allow for
price lags) identifying the 2002 quarters. DT4 (October, November, December) is the
baseline quarter.
The log-log specication o¤ers an appropriate functional form for investigating the
responsiveness of local per capita antibiotic sales to changes in the explanatory vari-
ables. Estimated coe¢ cients can be interpreted as elasticities. We apply the log-log
form to equation (14) assuming independently and identically normally distributed
errors (Model 1 ).22
To deal with the potential endogeneity problems related to prices and the inci-
dence of infections, we consider the inclusion of lagged values. Pk is the one-period
lag for price of a dened daily dose. As for the incidence of infections, we use the
average number of infections calculated over the years 1999-2001.
An econometric problem that could arise when estimating the demand model in
(14) is the spatial correlation due to spatial dependency in antibiotics consumption.
For this reason, we consider a second specication (Model 2 ). We estimate a spatial
two-stage least-square model (S-2SLS) which assumes that the spatially weighted
average of consumption in adjacent regions (DID k) a¤ects the consumption in each
region in addition to the standard explanatory variables. Spatial lags of exogenous
variables and cantonal dummies are used as a set of instruments to estimate the mean
antibiotic consumption in regions which are contiguous with region k.23
Our data set contains a relatively small number of time periods (t = 3), a relatively
large number of cross-sectional units (N = 240) and a zero within variation for most of
22Using a similar dataset, Filippini et al. (forthcoming) investigate determinants of small area
variations in the use of outpatient antibiotics. They apply a linear specication for the purpose of
measuring the welfare loss from unexplained variations and do not consider practice regulation.
23For more detailed explanation see Anselin (2001) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998).
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the explanatory variables. When price endogeneity is taken into account observations
for the rst quarter (t = 1) are not used. The only two variables that are changing over
time (3 quarters) are the outpatient per capita consumption and the price of a daily
dose. Consequently, the typical model for panel data, e.g. the least squares dummy
variable model and the error components model are not appropriate.24 The estimation
of Model 1 is then carried out with 720 observations and by using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.25 In the standard OLS specication the
error term is supposed to be independently and identically distributed. When the
assumption is partially relaxed, the linearization/Huber/White/sandwich (robust)
procedure allows to get estimates of the variance of the coe¢ cients that are robust
to the distribution assumptions. Instead, we use a two-stage least-square procedure
when spatial dependency is taken into account (Model 2 ). Estimations are performed
using the econometric software STATA.
3.2 Estimation results
Before focusing on the e¤ect of self-dispensing, we briey summarize the main results
from the estimation of the two models (Table 3). The adjusted R2 indicates that the
models explain approximately 75% of variations in the use of antibiotics.
The estimated spatial autoregressive parameter associated with the lag term
DID k in Model 2 is signicant and negative. This may suggest the evidence of
positive consumption externalities across the areas.26
Income elasticity varies between 0.16 and 0.22, which supports the hypothesis that
antibiotics are normal goods.27 Our result is in accordance with other ndings in the
24The reliability of these estimators depends on the extent of within-regional as well as between-
regional variations of the dependent and the independent variables. As Cameron and Trivedi (2005)
point out, the xed-e¤ects approach has an important weakness in that the coe¢ cients of the
explanatory variables are very imprecise if the variables variation over time is dominated by
variation across regions (between variation).
25We also run regressions with a between estimator and with and without spatial dependency.
The results are generally conrmed.
26A plausible explanation for this result is related to the double role of antibiotics. Antibiotics are
used to cure bacterial infections and to prevent the spread of infections and bacterial resistance to
other individuals. Consequently, the use of antibiotics in one area minimises the spread of infections
in neighbouring areas. This implies that a smaller amount of antibiotics is required to obtain the
same level of health benets. Although patientsimperfect information may suggest that this e¤ect
is not internalised by the individual, antibiotic prescribers such as general practitioners are quite
likely to be aware of this e¤ect.
27Baye et al. (1997) nd higher income elasticity (1.33) that may be related to di¤erences in the
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literature (Nilson and Laurell, 2005; Henricson et al.,1998; Thrane et al., 2003).
A higher proportion of children between 0 and 14 years of age increases antibiotic
consumption in the area; conversely antibiotics are less likely to be prescribed in the
areas with a larger proportion of individuals over 74 years of age compared to the
baseline class. A negative impact is also observed for the proportion of individuals
between 60 and over 74, although the coe¢ cient is not signicant.28
In both model specications the coe¢ cient of the incidence of infections exhibits
the expected positive sign but is poorly signicant. However, the estimated coe¢ -
cients of the second and the third quarters (DT2 and DT3) are both negative and
highly signicant. This is in accordance with seasonal uctuations observed by Else-
viers et al. (2007) across Europe.
Antibiotic price has a negative and signicant impact on antibiotic use in the area.
Price elasticities in Model 1 (-0.72) and Model 2 (-0.71) are close to the estimates
of Baye et al. (1997), who found negative compensated (-0.785) and uncompensated
(-0.916) own-price e¤ects for anti-infectives. Ellison et al. (1997) calculate price
elasticities unconditional on drug (cephalosporins) expenditure using US wholesales
data from 1985 to 1991. Their estimates range between -0.38 and -4.34.
The physiciansdensity is positively and signicantly associated with the local per
capita antibiotic use. Estimated elasticities are around 0.11 in both specications.
Similarly, an increase in the density of pharmacies leads to higher levels of per capita
outpatient antibiotic use in the area. The estimated coe¢ cient ranges between 0.61
and 0.63.
As for the impact of self-dispensing, we nd that the proportion of practices with-
out direct dispensing of drugs (NOSELF) has a negative e¤ect on antibiotic use,
although the coe¢ cient is not signicant. Consequently, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that areas without dispensing practices and areas with a relatively small
proportion of self-dispensing practices (below 50%) exhibit similar levels of antibi-
otic use per capita. However, when the proportion of dispensing practices is relatively
high (more than 50%), the e¤ect on consumption is positive and signicant. The esti-
mated coe¢ cients suggest that a one percent increase in the proportion of dispensing
practices beyond 50% will increase per capita antibiotic sales by 0.32% (0.29% when
population under study and the type of antibiotics considered (only penicillins and tetracyclines).
28Similar results are obtained, for instance, by Mousquès et al. (2003), who investigate a panel of
general practitioners prescribing antibiotics for rhynopharingeal infections.
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spatial dependency is taken into account).
It is worth noticing that the correlation between the rate of dispensing practices
and the density of pharmacies in the area is remarkable. This may suggest that self-
dispensing improve access to medical services. Note, however, that our estimated
coe¢ cient for dispensing practices is adjusted for the density of pharmacies and the
density of all practices. This implies that direct dispensing of drugs may increase
antibiotic consumption beyond the levels usually attained by satisfactory access to
medical services.
It can also be argued that the density of pharmacies is not a good indicator for
access to antibiotic treatment in the area. Indeed, travelling costs for the patient may
vary consistently. Consider, for instance, two small areas of the same size but di¤erent
number of pharmacies and inhabitants. The two areas may have the same number of
providers per inhabitant but the average patients distance from the pharmacy may
be di¤erent. To address this point we run separate estimations with the density of
the population as an additional regressor. This captures the level of urbanization of
the areas and can be used as a proxy for travelling distances. The variable is never
signicant, nor it changes the results of the other covariates signicantly.
4 Conclusions
In developed countries, prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics are generally kept
separate. Switzerland, however, represents and exception. The rationale for direct
dispensing is that prescribers improve access to pharmaceuticals in areas with low
density of pharmacies. However, the regulation of self-dispensing may not be e¢ -
cient in preventing antibiotic misuse. It has been suggested that prescribing costs
per patient in dispensing practices are higher than costs in non dispensing practices
(Morton-Jones and Pringle, 1993).
We investigated the impact of dispensing practices on the per capita outpatient
antibiotic consumption by combining a theoretical and an empirical approach. Our
model hypothesises that the regulator who allows for direct dispensing of drugs
does not take economic incentives on dispensing practices into account. Dispens-
ing practices may reduce diagnosis accuracy of bacterial infections compared to non-
dispensing practices, thus leading to higher rates of antibiotic use per capita. The
rationale behind this may be three-fold: the additional costs for stocking drugs and
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the risk of drugs expiring, the exposure to advertising pressure by pharmaceutical
rms, and the tendency to meet patientspreferences for antibiotic treatment.
Using an ad-hoc econometric model we estimated the impact of self-dispensing
on the demand for outpatient antibiotics in Switzerland. Our ndings support the
prediction of the theoretical frame that dispensing practices induce higher rates of
antibiotic use, ceteris paribus. The adjustment of economic incentives attached to
dispensing practices may then contribute to reduce the inappropriate use of antibiotics
and contain the threat of bacterial resistance.
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Appendix
Expected net benets of waiting
If a patient decides to wait he/she will recover naturally at the end of stage 2 with
probability 1=2 (viral infection). If, however, the patient is still sick by the end of
stage 2, the nature of his/her infection is assumed to be perfectly revealed (bacterial
infection). The patient knows that an antibiotic is required and needs a doctor for
the prescription. Using Table 1 we calculate the expected net benets of waiting as
u^Wj = u
h   1
2
x  1
2
(x+ w^2j + tdj)
= uh   x  1
2
(w^2j + tdj) . (15)
Expected benets of pharmacists advice
If the patient initially asks for a pharmacists advice an antipyretic/anti-inammatory
will always be purchased (antibiotics requires a doctors prescription). This either
reduces the recovering time or other kind of discomfort. With probability 1=2 (bac-
terial infection) the patient will need a doctors prescription (antibiotic) in stage 3.
The expected net benets of consulting a pharmacist are
u^PHj = u
h   1
2
(z + tdj)  1
2
(x+ w^2j + 2tdj)
= uh   1
2
[ (z + w^2j) + x+ 3tdj] . (16)
Patients choice
Comparison of (1) and (2) gives u^GPj > u^
W
j for any j 2 [1; ::;M ] if
x >  w1 + td
m, (17)
where w1 = f (1 + e) + z, dm = min fdjg and e^j = 12 .
The inequality in (17) is satised for those patients whose minimum distance from
a practice is
dm <
x   w1
t
 1. (18)
Similarly, comparison between (1) and (3) gives u^GPj > u^
PH
j if
dm >
 (3 w1   2z)  x
t
 2, (19)
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which is satised if patients copayment for consultations and treatment is lower than
the disutility for ine¤ective treatment (x).
A patient will then choose a consultation with the nearest GP provided that
inequalities (18) and (19) are satised. This requires 1 > dm > 2, hence x >
 (2 w1   z)  xW . Note, however, that 2 is negative for x >  (3 w1   2z)  xGP
and xGP > xW . Consequently, x > xGP ensures that all the patients initially prefer to
consult a GP rather than a pharmacist and a proportion of patients 1 initially prefer
a consultation with a GP rather than waiting. For xGP  x > xW the proportion of
patients who initially choose a GP is reduced to 1   2 since 2 > 0. Some patients
prefer to wait (those with dm > 1) and some patients prefer to see a pharmacist
(those with dm < 2). To summarize, we have u^Wj > u^
PH
j for any dj > 1 and
u^Wj < u^
PH
j for any dj < 2.
Consultation with GPs as a unique choice
For 1 < 1=(2M) some patients whose distance from the nearest practice is higher
than 1 prefer to wait rather than consulting a GP . On the other hand, for 1 
1=(2M) all the patients prefer a consultation with a GP than waiting. Using (4) we
derive
xc =
t
2M
+  w1, (20)
the critical value of disutility from waiting above which all the patients prefer to
consult a GP as an initial choice.
For x  xc only some patients prefer to consult a GP , a proportion 1 provided
that x > xGP . Hence, doctors initial demand is dened by (5) in Section 2.3 if
xGP < xc, i.e. if the number of practices is small enough: M < t
4f(1+e)
.
Substituting (20) into (5) we then nd GP js initial demand when consultations
are preferred by all the patients
Dj [x  xc] = N
M
. (21)
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Infection Prescription Cost of di¤erent patients strategies
Do nothing Pharmacy GP
v NA x z + tdj w1 + tdj
v A+NA w2 + tdj
b A+NA w2 + tdj
b NA+A x+ w2j + tdj x+ w2j + 2tdj x+ 2 (w1j + tdj)
Table 1: The total cost of treatment depends upon the strategy chosen by
the patient (the type of health care provider initially chosen), the prescribed
drugs (A=antibiotics, NA=antipyretic/anti-inammatory) and the type of infection
(b=bacterial, v=viral).
Variable Description Mean Std dev.
DID Dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants 11.714 13.061
Y Income per capita dened in CHF 23465 6849.4
POP1 Proportion of 0-14 in total population 0.1658 0.0243
POP2 Proportion of 15-25 in total population 0.1247 0.0173
POP3 Proportion of 26-59 in total population 0.4956 0.0314
POP4 Proportion of 60-74 in total population 0.1363 0.0213
POP5 Proportion of over 74 in total population 0.0776 0.0190
INF Incidence of common gastrointestinal infections 114.69 22.580
(salmonella and campylobacter) in 100000 inhabitants
DPHY Density of physicians for 100000 inhabitants 565.21 1052.5
DPHA Density of pharmacies for 100000 inhabitants 35.098 39.112
P Price of a dened daily dose 3.7112 0.3113
DBOR Whether or not the area borders other countries - -
DLAT Whether an area has a Latin (French and Italian) - -
or a German culture
DHOS Whether or not there is at least one hospital in the area - -
NOSELF Whether or not there are no self-dispensing practices - -
in the area
SELF Whether or not there is a majority of self-dispensing - -
practices in the area
Table 2: Variables notation and summary statistics.
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Model 1 Model 2
Equation Obs. Param. Adj. R2 F Stat. Obs. Param. Adj. R2 F Stat.
DIDk 720 16 74.79 72.01 720 17 75.18 74.08
DID k - - - - 720 50 0.8906 127.23
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -1.281034 0.684615 0.062 -1.902839 0.744341 0.011
Y 0.163043 0.060197 0.007 0.216634 0.063641 0.001
POP1 0.703562 0.143584 0.000 0.664964 0.143431 0.000
POP2 -0.317428 0.124092 0.011 -0.440513 0.123492 0.000
POP4 -0.007370 0.112065 0.948 -0.124772 0.122410 0.308
POP5 -0.246277 0.066649 0.000 -0.217604 0.066910 0.001
INF 0.018699 0.020525 0.363 0.024613 0.020776 0.237
DPHY 0.115811 0.026039 0.000 0.113958 0.025021 0.000
DPHA 0.628833 0.042007 0.000 0.606611 0.040992 0.000
P -0.718193 0.136700 0.000 -0.707091 0.136171 0.000
DBOR 0.006564 0.029894 0.826 0.016243 0.029448 0.581
DLAT -0.005033 0.039560 0.899 0.037546 0.039597 0.343
DHOSP 0.022479 0.034057 0.509 0.014804 0.032749 0.651
NOSELF -0.033244 0.032477 0.306 -0.029311 0.032220 0.363
SELF 0.316930 0.036244 0.000 0.294667 0.037328 0.000
DT2 -0.171434 0.024584 0.000 -0.204838 0.026876 0.000
DT3 -0.184310 0.023757 0.000 -0.214252 0.025625 0.000
DID k - - - -0.164941 0.054381 0.003
Table 3: Parameter estimates
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Figure 1: Patients alternatives to tackle a mild respiratory/gastro-intestinal infec-
tion: 1. to consult a doctor immediately; 2. to consult a pharmacist rst (if practices
cannot sell drugs directly); 3. to do nothing and wait.
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